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On April 10, 2007, National Football League Commissioner Roger Goodell
unveiled a new, league-wide personal conduct policy (NFL Personal Conduct
Policy), which vests in the league commissioner the power to suspend
indefinitely any player who engages in violent or criminal behavior.1 The NFL
Personal Conduct Policy is not written into the NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement. 2  However, the late executive director of the National Football
League Players Association (NFLPA), Gene Upshaw, had publicly voiced his
support for the policy.3 In addition, a panel of six to ten NFL players had also
informally approved the policy.
4
1. See NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY 1-3 (2008) [hereinafter
NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY], available at http://www.nflplayers.com/user/
template.aspx?finid=181&lmid=336&pid=0&type-n; see also Adam B. Marks, Note, Personnel
Foul on the National Football League Players Association: How Union Executive Director Gene
Upshaw Failed the Union 's Members By Not Fighting the Enactment of the Personal Conduct
Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1591-93 (2008); Judy Battista, N.F.L. Assesses Lengthy Bans for
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2007, at Dl [hereinafter Battista, N.F.L. Assesses Lengthy
Bans].
2. The current NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement does not contain a single reference
to the NFL Personal Conduct Policy in either the agreement itself or its appendices. See NFL
PLAYERS ASS'N, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012 (2006).
3. See Kevin Goheen, New Policy Goes Beyond Discipline, CIN. POST, Apr. 11, 2007, at
B1; see also Assoc. Press, Goodell Unveils New Conduct Policy, ESPN.COM, Apr. 11, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/storyid=2832098.
4. See Jim Ducibella, Local Football Player Could Face Difficult Return to NFL,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Mar. 27, 2007, at Al ("The Commissioner met ... with ...
Upshaw and about 10 players. All agreed that stronger discipline is necessary."); Dave George,
Column, Goodell Fosters Spirit of Needed Cooperation, PALM BEACH POST (Fla.), Apr. 13,
2007, at IC (suggesting that a six-player panel may have supported the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy); Posting of Rick Karcher to Sports Law Blog, Spies are Among Us, http://sports-
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In recent months, many coaches, commentators, and even law-review
authors have praised the new NFL Personal Conduct Policy.5 In their view, the
policy benefits society by keeping violent and criminal offenders away from
the media spotlight.6 Thus, the policy decreases the risk that children will be
influenced by the negative actions of professional football players.
7
However, there is also a darker side to the NFL Personal Conduct Policy.
Despite promoting positive role models, the NFL Personal Conduct Policy also
prevents certain members of the football workforce from practicing their
trade. In addition, the policy prevents football fans from expressing their
preference for games that would otherwise feature these suspended players.
9
For these reasons, the NFL Personal Conduct Policy might violate § I of the
Sherman Act. 10
This Article explains why some courts would likely find the NFL Personal
Conduct Policy to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, and explores ways in which
the NFL clubs could promote off-the-field decorum without risking antitrust
liability. Part I of this Article discusses the underlying business structure of
the NFL. Part II provides a brief overview of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Part III
analyzes the legality of the NFL Personal Conduct Policy under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Part IV proposes four ways in which NFL clubs could promote
positive off-the-field decorum without incurring antitrust risk.
law.blogspot.com/2008/11/spies-are-among-us.html (Nov. 8, 2008, 06:55 EST) (mentioning that
"(according to previous press reports) the new policy was assented to by a 6-player committee").
5. See, e.g., Greg Cote, Column, NFL's Tougher Conduct Policy Long Overdue, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 18, 2007, at Dl; Editorial, In Our View: Good for Goodell, COLUMBIAN
(Vancouver, Wash.), Apr. 15, 2007, at C, available at 2007 WLNR 9546368; Bill Rabinowitz,
NFL Lays Down Law with Henry, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 11, 2007, at B5 (noting Bengals
coach Marvin Lewis's support for the NFL Personal Conduct Policy); Stephen A. Smith, Column,
Good Riddance to Two Bad NFL Apples, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 11, 2007, at El; see also Robert
Ambrose, Note, The NFL Makes it Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of its Conduct Policy, the
NFL Protects its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1069, 1072 (2008)
(endorsing the NFL Personal Conduct Policy).
6. See, e.g., In Our View: Good for Goodell, supra note 5.
7. See Ambrose, supra note 5, at 1108-09.
8. See infra note 101 and accompanying text; see also John C. Weistart, Player Discipline
in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 703, 706 (1977)
("[L]eague suspensions [are] a form of discipline which may have severe economic consequences
for the athlete involved."); Jerry Bembry, NBA Suspends Sprewell a Year, BALT. SUN, Dec. 5,
1997, at IA (quoting NBA union leader Billy Hunter on the restriction of trade issue).
9. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
10. See Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 447-49 (1957) (finding that the
NFL teams' decision to blacklist a particular player states a claim under § I of the Sherman Act);
Weistart, supra note 8, at 705 ("It should quickly become apparent that the rules governing player
discipline also have an effect upon the demand for players' services. Thus, it is appropriate to
examine the application of these rules [under antitrust law] .... ). For a discussion of the
Sherman Act see infra Part II.
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I. THE PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL MARKETPLACE
A. NFL History and Core Operating Principles
Established in 1920, the NFL "is an unincorporated association comprised of
[thirty-two independently owned] member clubs which own and operate
professional football teams."" The NFL is structured almost identically to
America's three other major professional sports leagues-Major League
Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey
League.2 The NFL clubs serve as the only employers of premier professional
football labor in the United States.'3
Every day the NFL performs various administrative functions on behalf of
its member clubs. These functions include organizing and scheduling games
and promulgating league rules. 4  For the most part, these activities are
governed by the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, which are the primary
documents that set forth the relationship between the NFL and its member
clubs.' 5 However, in 1968, the National Labor Relations Board recognized the
NFLPA as a labor organization within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, and as "the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL
players."' 6 As a result, the NFL member clubs, as a matter of law, are required
to bargain with the NFLPA over mandatory terms and conditions of
employment. 17  Any agreement reached between the NFL clubs and the
NFLPA through collective bargaining naturally trumps any conflicting terms
stated in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.
B. Commissioner Suspensions
Since the early days of professional sports, club owners have vested power
in a league commissioner to serve as the chief executive officer of their joint
venture league. In this capacity, league commissioners have sought to suspend
players for a wide range of misconduct.'
8
11. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976); see also NFL
History by Decade, http://www.nfl.com/history (last visited Jan. 10, 2009).
12. See Marc Edelman, Why the "Single Entity" Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A
Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDaAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 891, 903-04 (2008) [hereinafter Edelman, Why the "Single Entity" Defense Can Never
Apply to NFL Clubs].
13. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610.
14. Id.
15. See Edelman, Why the "Single Entity" Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs, supra
note 12, at 905-06.
16. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610.
17. Id.
18. For one of the earliest cases on record of a league commissioner attempting to suspend a
player, see American League Baseball Club of New York v. Johnson, 179 N.Y.S. 498, 499-500
(Sup. Ct. 1919), affd sub nom. Am. League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Johnson, 179 N.Y.S. 898
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Historically, most commissioner suspensions have involved either on-the-
field misconduct or off-the-field misconduct with some reasonable nexus to the
player's on-the-field activities. 19 The earliest instances of off-the-field player
suspensions typically involved gambling. For example, during the 1920-21
offseason, MLB Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis banned eight
members of the Chicago White Sox for purportedly betting against their team
in the 1919 World Series. 21 Thereafter, in 1948, NHL President Clarence
22Campbell suspended two NHL hockey players for gambling. Then, in 1954,
NBA President Maurice Podoloff indefinitely suspended rookie basketball
player Jack Molinas for gambling on basketball games in which his team had
played.23
Beginning in the early 1980s, some league commissioners also began to
suspend players for other forms of wrongdoing, such as taking illegal drugs-
presumably based on the link between drug use and a player's athletic
24performance. Initially, commissioners attempted to unilaterally suspend
players for drug use. 25  However, after several labor arbitrators overturned
early drug suspensions, sports leagues and their players associations began to
(App. Div. 1920). At the time, Byron Johnson went by the title of American League President
rather than commissioner. Id. at 502.
19. See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
20. See Weistart, supra note 8, at 703 n.2, 706-07 & nn.13, 16.
21. See No Precedent for Reinstatement, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 25, 1989, at 4D (noting that
the Black Sox Scandal players banned from MLB included Shoeless Joe Jackson, Buck Weaver,
Ed Cicotte, Fred McMullen, Happy Felsch, Lefty Williams, Chick Gandel, and Swede Risberg).
These players were banned even though no court ever found them guilty of any wrongdoing. See
Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
284, 305 (2005); see also Hal Bock, If Suspended for Gambling, Rose Might Find Fame Fleeting,
ST. LOUIS-POST DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 1989, at IF (noting that one of the players suspended for
life, Shoeless Joe Jackson, seemed to be exonerated by a number of investigations).
22. See Bock, "supra note 21; Notable Sports Suspensions, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 5, 1997, at C5.
23. See Dave Anderson, Sports of the Times, The N.B.A. Holds its Breath, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 1987, at B7; see also Bock, supra note 21 (noting that Molinas was the only player ever
suspended from the NBA for life for gambling).
24. See Jason M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner "Best
Interests" Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1645, 1667-68 &
n.213 (1999) (noting the movement to suspend players for using drugs began in August 1980,
after Ontario police arrested Texas Rangers pitcher Ferguson Jenkins for possessing "two ounces
of marijuana, two grams of hashish, and four grams of cocaine"); cf Anderson, supra note 23
(reporting link between cocaine addiction and point-fixing in basketball).
25. See Pollack, supra note 24, at 1668-69.
26. See, e.g., id. at 1668-70 (noting that in 1980, Arbitrator Raymond Goetz overruled
Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn's attempted suspension of pitcher Ferguson Jenkins for drug
possession, and in 1984 Arbitrator Richard Bloch terminated Kuhn's drug-related suspension of
pitcher Pascual Perez).
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bargain over drug policy, thus leading to collectively bargained drug policies
that rarely allowed for lifetime suspensions.
27
C. NFL Personal Conduct Policy
Historically, there have even been a few isolated instances in which
commissioners have attempted to suspend players for off-the-field conduct that
has involved absolutely no nexus to on-the-field performance. 28 Yet, the NFL
Personal Conduct Policy marks the only policy in American professional
sports history whereby a league commissioner has sought to systematically rid
the league of players based entirely on their off-the-field conduct.29 Hence, the
policy has been controversial.
1. The NFL Personal Conduct Policy
Most football fans incorrectly presume that the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy was first introduced at Commissioner Goodell's now-famous April 10,
2007 media conference during which he announced the suspensions of players
Adam "Pac Man" Jones and Chris Henry. However, in reality, the original
NFL Personal Conduct Policy dates back at least as far as May 23, 2000, when
the NFL club owners, in response to negative publicity that the NFL received
during linebacker Ray Lewis's then-ongoing murder trial, unilaterally
empowered the league's then-Commissioner Paul Tagliabue to suspend players
31for a wide range of off-the-field misconduct.
27. See Notable Sports Suspensions, supra note 22 (noting the following instances: Michael
Ray Richardson was suspended by the NBA for substance abuse in 1986 but reinstated July 21,
1988; Roy Tarpley was suspended by the NBA for substance abuse in 1991 but reinstated
September 30, 1994; Mitchell Wiggins and Lewis Lloyd of the Houston Rockets were suspended
for substance abuse in 1987, but reinstated in 1989); The Reaction, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1997, at
C6 (noting that, pursuant to the league collective bargaining agreement, NFL Commissioner Paul
Tagliabue gave Washington, D.C., football player Dexter Manley an automatic lifetime ban in
1989 after his third positive drug test; however, the commissioner then reinstated Manley in
November 1990); Greg Stoda, Column, Dolphins Must Quit Habit of Forgiving and Just Forget,
PALM BEACH POST (Fla.), Apr. 26, 2006, at 1C ("[Dolphins running back Ricky] Williams has
been suspended by the NFL-this time for the 2006 season-for a fourth violation of its
substance-abuse policy. The announcement came Tuesday night that Williams' appeal of his
most recent positive drug test was denied.").
28. See, e.g., Bock, supra note 21 (noting MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn's suspension of
Detroit Tigers pitcher Denny McLain in 1970 for illegally carrying a gun).
29. See Scan Bukowski, Note, Flag on the Play: 25 to Life for the Offense of Murder, 3
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 106, 110 (2001).
30. For example, the Wikipedia page entitled "National Football League player conduct
controversy" makes no textual reference to the predecessor NFL Personal Conduct Policy. See
Wikipedia, National Football League Player Conduct Controversy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
NationalFootballLeagueplayer conduct controversy (last visited Jan. 12, 2009).
31. See David Elfin, NFL Owners Expand Rules on Player Crime, WASH. TIMES, May 24,
2000, at BI; see also Bukowski, supra note 29, at I 10-11 (discussing the NFL's Violent Crime
Policy that was instituted in 1998); Memorandum from Legal Department to Pro Star Sports
Agency on NFL's "Personal Conduct Policy" (June 22, 2000) [hereinafter Pro Star Sports
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Under the June 2000 NFL Personal Conduct Policy, the NFL clubs vested
power in the league commissioner to fine, suspend, or banish any player who
was convicted of criminal activity or admitted to engaging in wrongdoing.
32
As a practical matter, however, former NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue
never suspended any player under the old NFL policy for more than a de
minimis number of games. 33 Hence, the policy never became the focus of
much attention.
Less than one year after the NFL clubs appointed Goodell as their new
commissioner, the thirty-two clubs, at his request, decided to strengthen the
NFL Personal Conduct Policy by adding longer suspensions, indefinite
suspensions, and even the commissioner's right to suspend players for non-
criminal behavior.34  Paragraph 1 of the April 10, 2007 version of the NFL
Personal Conduct Policy states as follows:
Engaging in violent and/or criminal activity is unacceptable and
constitutes conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public
confidence in the National Football League. Such conduct alienates
the fans on whom the success of the League depends and has
negative and sometimes tragic consequences for both the victim and
the perpetrator.
35
The following paragraphs of the NFL Personal Conduct Policy then list a
series of punishments that the NFL clubs empower their commissioner to
impose on any player that the commissioner believes to have committed a
Agency Memorandum], available at http://www.prostaronline.com/nflconductpolicy.html
(stating that the 2000 Personal Conduct Policy supercedes the NFL's earlier Violent Crime
Policy). Some even trace the NFL Personal Conduct Policy back to when the NFL clubs
maintained something they referred to as a Violent Crime Policy. See Bukowski, supra note 29,
at 110; Pro Star Sports Agency Memorandum, supra.
32. Pro Star Sports Agency Memorandum, supra note 31.
33. See, e.g., Around the League, Packers, Titans Fuming, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 30, 2003, at 6
(noting that New Orleans Saints linebacker Derrick Rodgers was supended for one game under
the NFL Personal Conduct Policy after Rodgers pleaded no contest to charges he attacked his
wife and a man at a restaurant in Miami); Assoc. Press, Conduct Policy Prompts Suspension,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 20, 2002, at 9C (noting that former NFL Commissioner Paul
Tagliabue suspended free agent tackle Victor Riley for one game after Riley was accused of
ramming his vehicle several times into a vehicle occupied by his wife and infant daughter); Rich
Cimini, L.I. Grand Jury Quizzes Jets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 11, 2003, at 63 (noting that former
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue suspended New York Jets offensive lineman John "Jumbo"
Elliot for one game in 2000 for violating the NFL's Personal Conduct Policy); NFL Players
Arrested in 2000, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Jan. 22, 2001, at D4 (reporting that eight NFL
players were suspended under the NFL Personal Conduct Policy in 2000, none for longer than
two games).
34. See Changes Approved on Player Conduct, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2007, at D7; NFL
Adopts New Conduct Policy, BALTIMORERAVENS.COM, Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.baltimore
ravens.com/News/Articles/2007/04/NFLAdoptsNew ConductPolicy.aspx.
35. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2007), available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2798214. This Policy was replaced by a new version
in 2008.
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violent or criminal act.36  These punishments include not only temporary
suspensions but also, far more significantly, permanent suspensions or
"banishment from the League."
37
2. The Relationship (or Lack Thereol) Between the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy and the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement
Any relationship between the NFL Personal Conduct Policy and the NFL
Collective Bargaining Agreement is extremely remote. Although Paragraph 15
of the NFL Player Contract-also included as Appendix C to the NFL
Collective Bargaining Agreement-empowers the league commissioner to
suspend players for gambling, performance enhancing drug use, and other
conduct that the Commissioner deems to be "detrimental to the League or
professional football, '38 there is no compelling argument that Paragraph 15 of
the NFL Player Contract is intended to address off-the-field conduct that lacks
any nexus to the game of football. 39 In addition, neither the NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement nor the NFL Player Contract makes a direct reference
to a commissioner's right to suspend a player for off-the-field violent or
criminal conduct. 40 Indeed, the NFL Personal Conduct Policy is not mentioned
anywhere in the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement.
4 1
Furthermore, the new NFL Personal Conduct Policy is not a legally binding
amendment or rider to the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement. This is
because the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement explicitly states that
"[n]one of the Articles of this Agreement may be changed, altered or amended
other than by a written agreement." 42 The NFL Personal Conduct Policy is not
a signed, written agreement between the NFL clubs and the NFLPA; rather, it
is a regulation the NFL clubs unilaterally impose on all individuals publicly
associated with it.
43
36. See id. at 2-3.
37. Id. at 2.
38. NFL PLAYERS ASS'N, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012 app.C,
para. 15, at 253 (2006) [hereinafter NFL PLAYER CONTRACT].
39. To illustrate this point, compare the language in Paragraph Fifteen of the NFL Player
Contract, describing specific conduct prohibited by the NFL, id., with the far broader language in
Paragraph Eleven, which states that a team may release a player when he has "engaged in
personal conduct reasonably judged by [the club] to adversely affect or reflect on [the] Club," id.
para. 11, at 252.
40. See NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012, supra note 2.
41. See id.
42. Id. art. LV § 19, at 235 (Parol Evidence).
43. See NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
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II. AN INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST LAW
A. Antitrust Basics
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in pertinent part, states that "[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is
declared to be illegal.'"44  Although most claims under § I of the Sherman Act
involve the restraint of trade in product markets, § 1 of the Sherman Act also
prohibits restraints of trade in labor markets.4 5
Antitrust law forbids employers from engaging in group boycotts for two
reasons. First, group boycotts harm consumers.46 In the seminal case Eastern
State Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass 'n v. United States,47 the Supreme Court
explained:
An act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong
when done by many acting in concert, for it then takes on the form of
a conspiracy, and may be prohibited or punished, if the result be
hurtful to the public or to the individual against whom the concerted
action is directed.48
In addition, group boycotts by employers deny workers the ability to "secur[e]
employment in [their] chosen avocation, trade and calling., 49 This is a right
strongly entrenched in American common law, and one that has implicitly
44. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was
"intended to serve both political and economic purposes and to prevent any one business from
becoming more powerful than the government." Marc Edelman, Can Antitrust Law Save the
Minnesota Twins? Why Commissioner Selig's Contraction Plan Was Never a Sure Deal, 10
SPORTS LAW. J. 45, 56-57 (2003).
45. See Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and "Free Movements" Risks of Expanding
U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 405, 414-15 (2009);
see also Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1967); McNeil v.
Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 881 (D. Minn. 1992) (citing FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)); Marc Edelman & C. Keith Harrison, Analyzing the
WNBA 's Mandatory Age and Education Policy from a Legal, Cultural, and Ethical Perspective:
Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape, 3 Nw. J.L. AND SOC. POL'Y 1, 12 (2008);
Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality ofAge Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 734 (2006).
46. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 4.13, at 161-64 (4th ed. 2003); see also Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) ("Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by
traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category. They have
not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances .
(footnote omitted)).
47. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
48. Id. at 614 (quoting Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433,440-41 (1910)).
49. Mattison v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 3 Ohio Dec. 526, 527 (1895) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Petitioner's Opening Brief at 33, Radovich v. Nat'l Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (No. 94) (citing various cases "[flor additional common law
treatment of boycotting and blacklisting as restraints of trade").
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become a part of federal antitrust policy.50 As one court explained, "[e]very
man has the liberty of employing and being employed, and every man must
respect the like liberty in others."' 1 For that reason, the Honorable Learned
Hand explained in his famous opinion, Gardella v. Chandler, that § 1 of the
Sherman Act "certainly forbid[s] all restraints. . . which unreasonably forbid[]
anyone to practice his calling.,
52
B. Applying § 1 of the Sherman Act
Courts determine whether a particular restraint violates § 1 of the Sherman
Act by applying a three-step test. First, a court will consider two threshold
issues: (1) whether there is an effect on trade or commerce among more than
one state, and (2) whether there is a sufficient agreement among two or more
parties to constitute a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy."
If both of these preliminary issues are satisfied, a court will then perform
one of three sanctioned tests to determine whether the agreement produces a
prima facie antitrust violation.54 On one end of the spectrum, if the agreement
seems so nefarious that it is unlikely to have any redeeming value, a court will
apply the per se test, under which it simply presumes a prima facie violation.
55
On the other end of the spectrum, if an agreement seems to yield potential
economic benefits, a court will apply the Rule of Reason test, under which it
would fully investigate the agreement's net economic impact.56 Meanwhile, in
50. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(finding that one of the antitrust harms of the group boycott was that "the victim of the boycott is
injured by being excluded from the market he seeks to enter").
51. Mattison, 3 Ohio Dec. at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is irrelevant whether
the victim of the boycott is able to find employment in a different vocation, so long as the boycott
victim finds the alternative employment inferior. See id.
52. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J., concurring).
53. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1062 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1); see also Nat'l Hockey
League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462, 469 (6th Cir. 2005);
McCreery Angus Farms v. Am. Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1016-17 (S.D. I11. 1974), aff'd,
506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cit. 1974); Blalock v. Ladies Prof'I Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1263
(N.D. Ga. 1973); John R. Gerba, Comment, Instant Replay: A Review of the Case of Maurice
Clarett, The Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption, and Its Protection of the NFL
Draft Eligibility Rule, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2383, 2388 (2005).
54. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 13; see also Edelman & Doyle, supra note 45, at
415.
55. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 13; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
The per se test is intended to be a bright-line test that "facilitates legal certainty and promotes
judicial economy." Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 13. The purpose of the test is to avoid
"subjective policy judgments" that most courts recognize "are more appropriate for legislative,
rather than judicial, determination." Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320
(D. Conn. 1977).
56. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 13 (citing Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978)). To establish the prima facie case of an antitrust
violation under the Rule of Reason, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) market power; (2)
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between those two scenarios, a court might also apply a so-called "quick look,"
"truncated" or "abbreviated" Rule of Reason test, 57 under which it would
consider the economic effects of a particular agreement based on only a
"rudimentary understanding of economics." 58
Presuming that a court finds a prima facie antitrust violation, a court would
next determine whether any antitrust exemption or affirmative defense would
negate the finding of liability.59 The most frequently cited exemption or
affirmative defense, in the context of an agreement among members of a
professional sports league, is the non-statutory labor exemption, which
precludes antitrust liability for any conduct that emerges through the proper
workings of the collective bargaining process. As a matter of public policy,
the non-statutory labor exemption reflects the view that employees are better
off negotiating together rather than individually, and that labor law, rather than
antitrust law, should apply to situations where employers and employees have
engaged in good faith collective bargaining.6' Not all courts, however, have
agreed on where, exactly, to draw the line on this defense.
III. WHY THE NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY MAY VIOLATE ANTITRUST
LAW
Based on various splits in the circuits, it is impossible to predict with
certainty whether a reviewing court would find the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy to violate § I of the Sherman Act.62 However, if a plaintiff were tochallenge the NFL Personal Conduct Policy in either the Third, Sixth, Eighth,
net anticompetitive effects; and (3) harm. Id. (citing 54 AM. JUR. 20 Monopolies and Restraints
of Trade § 49 (2007)).
57. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 763-64, 770 (1999); see also Mark W. Pletcher
& Ludovic C. Ghesquiere, In Restraint of Trade: The Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Plan, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 147, 175-76 (2007); Ryan T. Jardine, Note, ECONOMI0 LAW- Vertical Minimum
Pricing in Leegin-Adrift with the Rule of Reason; Sinking with StareDecisis; Leegin Creative
Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127S. Ct. 2705 (2007), 8 WyO. L. REV. 683, 697 (2008).
58. Cal. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 770; United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d
Cir. 1993) ("The abbreviated rule of reason is an intermediate standard. It applies to cases where
'per se condemnation is inappropriate, but where no elaborate industry lanalysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an inherently suspect restraint." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
59. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 14 (citing PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 106-22 (5th ed. 1997)).
60. Id; see also Edelman & Doyle, supra note 45, at 417-18; see also Nat'l Basketball
Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 688 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[A]ntitrust laws do not prohibit employers
from acting jointly in bargaining with a common union.").
61. See Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 14; see also Weistart, supra note 8, at 705
n. 10 (stating that courts require arm's length collective bargaining in order for the agreement to
fall under the non-statutory labor exemption).
62. These splits primarily revolve around two issues: whether the NFL clubs constitute two
or more parties, and whether the non-statutory labor exemption could apply to conduct not
directly written into a collective bargaining agreement. See discussion infra Parts III.A.2, III.C.
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or D.C. circuits, it is more likely than not that the reviewing court would find
an antitrust violation.
63
A. Threshold Issues
If an NFL player were to challenge his suspension under the NFL Personal
Conduct Policy, the reviewing court would begin its analysis by considering
whether two threshold issues are met: (1) whether there is some effect on trade
or commerce among more than one state, and (2) whether there is a sufficient
agreement among two of more parties to constitute a "contract, combination
*.. or conspiracy.
'64
1. Interstate Commerce
There is no real dispute about whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy has
an effect on trade or commerce among more than one state. 65 The Supreme
Court addressed this issue affirmatively in the case Radovich v. National
Football League, in which it found that the NFL clubs indeed engage in
interstate commerce.
2. Is there a Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy Among Two or More
Parties?
Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy involves a "contract,
combination or conspiracy" among two or more parties, however, is somewhat
less certain.67  Most courts have held that an agreement among NFL clubs
always constitutes a contract, combination, or conspiracy among two or more
parties. 68  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for
example, was among the first to reach this conclusion in the 1982 case North
63. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
64. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1); see also Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey
Club, 419 F.3d 462, 468-69 (6th Cir. 2005); McCreery Angus Farms v. Am. Angus Ass'n, 379 F.
Supp. 1008, 1016-17 (.D. I11. 1974), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974); Blalock v. Ladies
Prof'l Golf Ass'n, 359 f. Supp. 1260, 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Gerba, supra note 53, at 2388-89.
65. See, e.g., Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453 (1957) (finding that tlhe
National Football League clubs engage in interstate commerce); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 282 (1972) ("Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce.");
Denver Rockets, 325:F. Supp. at 1055 ("The business of professional basketball as conducted by
the NBA and the NBA teams on a multi-state basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise and
broadcast the games for interstate transmission, is trade or commerce among the several States
within the meaning of the Sherman Act.").
66. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 453.
67. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (the
seminal case for deciding whether two or more parties exist for purposes of liability under § 1 of
the Sherman Act).
68. See Edelman, Why the "Single Entity" Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs, supra
note 12, at 893 n. II; Marc Edelman, Single-Entity Sports Ruling: 'Needle' in a Haystack,
N.Y.L.J. Jan. 2, 2008, at 4, 12.
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American Soccer League v. National Football League.69 In that case, the
Second Circuit held that the NFL is best defined as a collection of
"individually owned separate professional football teams," which derive
separate revenues from sources including "local TV and radio, parking and
concessions." 70 The court went on to explain:
To tolerate [treating the NFL as a single entity] would permit league
members to escape antitrust responsibility for any restraint entered
into by them that would benefit their league or enhance their ability
to compete even though the benefit would be outweighed by its
anticompetitive effects .... The sound and morejust procedure is to
judge the legality of such restraints according to well-recognized
standards of our antitrust laws rather than permit their exemption
71
Shortly thereafter, the Third Circuit, in Mid-South Grizzlies v. National
Football League, similarly refused to find that the NFL was a single entity.72
In that case, the court held that, although NFL teams shared substantial
revenues with one another, "within certain geographic submarkets two league
members [nevertheless] compete with one another for ticket buyers, for local
broadcast revenue, and for sale of concession items like food and beverages
and team paraphemalia."
73
Likewise, the Eighth Circuit in McNeil v. National Football League7 4 found
the NFL to consist of a joint venture of separate member clubs, pointing out
that courts on numerous occasions had already "expressly rejected" the single-
entity defense.7 5  The First and Ninth Circuits have also reached this
69. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 1251-52.
71. Id. at 1257 (emphasis added).
72. 720 F.3d 772, 786-87 (3d Cir. 1983).
73. Id. at 787.
74. 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
75. Id. at 879.
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conclusion directly, 76 as well as the Sixth Circuit in dicta,77 and the D.C.
Circuit by inference.78
Nevertheless, two circuits-the Fourth and the Seventh-have issued
opinions that create some ambiguity. The Seventh Circuit, in the case
American Needle Inc. v. National Football League, recently held that the
question of whether any professional sports league is truly a single entity
should be addressed "'one league at a time,' . . . 'one facet of a league at a
time.' ' 79  Meanwhile, the Fourth Circuit in Seabury Management, Inc. v.
Professional Golfers' Ass 'n of America held that a trade association and its
separately incorporated division should be treated as a single entity for antitrust
purposes because the two entities functioned as a single economic unit.
80
Nevertheless, Seabury might not present a true conflict with the majority view
because it involved a trade association and not an association of separately
owned sports teams. 81
B. Prima Facie Test
Presuming a plaintiff can meet both threshold issues, the next issue for the
court to consider is whether the plaintiff can make a prima facie showing that
the NFL Personal Conduct Policy violates antitrust law.82  The Supreme
76. See Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem'l
Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1984). Specifically,
the First Circuit in Sullivan rejected finding the NFL to be a single entity, because sports teams
"compete in several ways off the field." Thus, these teams "pursue diverse interests and are not a
single enterprise." Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission rejected applying the single-entity defense to the NFL because
"[e]ven though the individual clubs often act for the common good of the [league, a court] must
not lose sight of the purpose of the [league] . . . , which is to promote and foster the primary
business of [l]eague members." L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1389 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
77. See Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d
462, 470 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that "[j]ust as the National Football League could not accurately
be characterized as a 'single economic entity,' neither could the [Ontario Hockey League]"
(citation omitted)).
78. See Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP),
2008 WL 4547518, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008) (citing Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) and other circuits for the proposition that the NFL is a combination of
independent teams and not a single entity).
79. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Chi. Prof'I Sports Ltd. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996)), petition for
cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3326 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2008) (No. 08-661).
80. Seabury Mgmt., Inc. v. Profl Golfers' Ass'n ofAm., Inc., Nos. 94-1814, 94-1688, 1995
WL 241379, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 1995).
81. See Posting of Gabe Feldman to Sports Law Blog, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2008/
10/msg-new-media-antitrust-claim-survives.html (Oct. 13, 2008, 23:42 EST).
82. See Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 20; see also Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526
U.S. 756, 769 (1999); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Conn.
1977).
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Court's recent decision in the case Texaco Inc. v. Dagher83 seems to indicate
that, because the NFL is a joint venture, the NFL Personal Conduct Policy is
subject to review only under a full Rule of Reason analysis.84 Applying the
Rule of Reason test, a player seeking to challenge the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy must show the following three elements: (1) market power; (2) net anti-
competitive effects; and (3) harm. 85
1. Market Power
Market power is defined as "the power to control prices or exclude
competition." 86  Courts generally determine the presence (or absence) of
market power based on economist testimony.87 However, if such testimony is
unavailable or inconclusive, the court will consider simple market share
estimates as the best proxy.88
When analyzing market share data, a court determines the scope of the
relevant market based on both product and geographic considerations. 89 The
relevant product market in a labor-side sports dispute has always been found to
be the market for labor in the same ability-level of that respective sport. 90
Meanwhile, the relevant geographic market is "the market in which the seller
83. 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
84. See id. at 3 ("We granted certiorari to determine whether it is per se illegal under § 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for a lawful, economically integrated joint venture to set the
prices at which the joint venture sells its products. We conclude that it is not, and accordingly we
reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals."); see also id. at 7. For support of this
position specifically in the context of sports, albeit predating Dagher, see Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (applying the Rule of Reason to an alleged group
boycott in the joint venture NFL), and Weistart, supra note 8, at 723 ("In determining whether
particular disciplinary action bears the necessary relationship to the concerns which support self-
regulation, the rule of reason will be applied, except, of course, where the action so clearly
reflects an anti-competitive motive as to call for treatment under the per se doctrine.").
85. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 20. However, "proof of actual detrimental
effects, such as a reduction of output, can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power,
which is but a surrogate for detrimental effects." FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
460-61 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, at 26 (quoting United States v. E.l. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)). Others have defined market power as "the ability to
raise prices above those that would prevail in a competitive market." E.g., United States v.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993).
87. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 20.
88. Id (citing SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, at 28).
89. Id. (citing SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, at 33).
90. See, e.g., Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers, 419 F.3d 462, 472
(6th Cir. 2005) (finding there to be a relevant product market for sixteen- to twenty-year-old
hockey players); Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 59-60 (lst Cir. 2002)
(upholding jury finding that the relevant product market was broader than just soccer labor from
Division-I United States college teams); Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (upholding a district court opinion describing the relevant product market for the labor
of football players seeking to enter professional football from college).
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operates and to which the purchaser can turn for supplies." 91 This is "the
geographic area to which players can turn, as a practical matter, for alternate
opportunities for employment." 92 Notably, "[t]his factor is important because
if there is a limited opportunity for practical employment [in a given industry],
a market restriction is more likely to [produce] an antitrust violation."
93
In the context of an antitrust claim brought by a suspended NFL player, the
NFL clubs exert market power in the market for premier professional football
labor within the United States because the NFL is the only elite-level employer
of professional football players in the United States.94 In addition, even if a
court were to define the relevant market for professional labor as extending
throughout either all of North America or the world, the NFL would still exert
market power given that the world's second most prominent professional
football league-the Canadian Football League-imposes a rule that forbids
teams from signing any player who is currently serving an NFL suspension.
95
2. Net Anticompetitive Effects
A net anticompetitive effect, meanwhile, is one where the anticompetitive
effects of a particular agreement are greater than their pro-competitive
benefits.96 Although courts until the late 1970s had considered this prong of
the Rule of Reason to allow intermingling social policy with economic
analysis, the Supreme Court explained in the seminal case National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States that pro-competitive effects relate only
to an agreement's economic effects, and not to social ones. 97 In other words,
91. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, at 33 (quoted in Edelman & Harrison, supra
note 45, at 20); see also Plymouth Whalers, 419 F.3d at 471 ("Generally, a relevant market is one
which includes products or services that are reasonably interchangeable with, as well as identical
to, defendant's product affected by the rule or regulation being challenged." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
92. Fraser, 284 F.3d at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 20.
94. Cf Jeffrey A. Durney, Comment, Fair or Foul? The Commissioner and Major League
Baseball's Disciplinary Process, 41 EMORY L.J. 581, 617 (1992) (explaining that Major League
Baseball clubs collectively exert market power for this same reason). See also Marks, supra note
1, at 1598 ("With the exception of the Arena Football League, which is barely comparable to the
NFL, there are currently no other professional football leagues in the United States.").
95. See Marks, supra note 1, at 1598; see also Marc Edelman, Time for CFL to Rethink
Suspension Rule, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS B. J. 32 (2007) ("By enforcing the Ricky Williams
Rule, the CFL has [similarly] exposed itself to U.S. antitrust liability, even though the CFL only
has Canadian-based teams.").
96. See Nat'l Soc'y ofProf'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1978); see also
Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 21.
97. See Prof l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695-96 (safety concerns are not pro-competitive
benefits); see also FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462-63 (1986) (improved
"quality of care" is not in itself a pro-competitive benefit under antitrust law); United States v.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) ("A restraint on competition cannot be justified
solely on the basis of social welfare concerns."); id. at 675 (finding the increased competition in
curriculum, campus activities, and student-faculty ratio is not a pro-competitive benefit); Union
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the Rule of Reason should not turn "on a court's intuitive judgment of whether
a particular practice seems sensible and equitable, but rather on economic
analysis."
98
Under this prong of the Rule of Reason, a plaintiff has the initial burden of
demonstrating the presence of anti-competitive effects within some relevant
market. 99 Should the plaintiff meet this burden, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to provide evidence of pro-competitive effects to justify any
anticompetitive injuries. 00
a. Aggregate Anticompetitive Effects
The NFL Personal Conduct Policy produces strong anticompetitive effects in
national, North American, and worldwide markets for professional football
labor. This is because the NFL Personal Conduct Policy prevents prospective
NFL players from practicing their profession'0 1 and denies consumers the
opportunity to express their preference for watching games featuring the
boycotted players.
As a matter of antitrust law, it is generally illegal for members of any
industry to collectively boycott a worker.' ° 3  For example, in the case
Anderson v. Shipowners Ass 'n of Pacific Coast, the Supreme Court held that it
was illegal for an association of ship owners to collectively boycott a
Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 656 (2d Cir. 1957) ("Under the Sherman Act the test of
validity for any restraint of trade is not the motive of the parties who act in concert. Restraints of
trade must be examined not merely for the intent of their creators but for their reasonableness
..... ); Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 21-22.
98. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS & THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
PROBLEMS 42 (3d ed. 2004); see also Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688 ("Contrary to its name, the
Rule [of Reason] does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a
challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the
challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions."); Pletcher & Ghesquiere, supra note 57,
at 175 ("[G]ood motives alone will not validate an otherwise objectionable anti-competitive
practice. Likewise, a group's proffered justification of promoting the social good is not enough to
save anti-competitive conduct ...." (footnote omitted)); Note, "Political" Blacklisting in the
Motion Picture Industry: A Sherman Act Violation, 74 YALE L.J. 567, 575 (1965) ("[T]he
Sherman Act could not be evaded by good motives .... ).
99. Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 413 F.3d 462,
469 (6th Cir. 2005).
100. Id. Assuming the defendant succeeds in this regard, the burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to "show that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive
manner." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066-67 (C.D. Cal.
1971); see also Weistart, supra note 8, at 706.
102. See Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 336 (7th Cir. 1967) (citing
Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)).
103. See Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n of Pac. Coast, 272 U.S. 359, 360-63 (1926); see
also Radovich, 352 U.S. at 453-54; Quinonez v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824,
828-29 (5th Cir. 1976); Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1067.
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prospective worker who had not been granted his certification card from the
defendant ship-owners' association.
10 4
Further, four separate cases in the context of professional sports have found
it illegal for club owners outside the scope of a collective bargaining
agreement to impose league-wide rules that restrict player eligibility. 10 5 In the
first of these cases, Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Central District of California overturned an NBA
rule that required all prospective men's professional basketball players to wait
at least four years after completing high school before applying for the NBA
draft. 106  Although the Denver Rockets court acknowledged that the NBA
education policy might have been socially "commendable," it explained that
the goals of promoting education may not "override the objective of fostering
economic competition which is embodied in the antitrust laws."'10 7 In other
words, "antitrust law is not a forum for social policy"; it is exclusively about
balancing pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects. 10 8
Six years later in Linseman v. World Hockey Ass 'n, the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut found the group boycott of young
athletes to be illegal. 1° 9 In Linseman, an amateur hockey player brought suit
against the World Hockey Association (WHA), contending that the league's
prohibition against players under the age of twenty violated § 1 of the Sherman
Act. 1 0  Consistent with the Denver Rockets holding, the District of
Connecticut ultimately concluded that the WHA's age/education policy was a
"per se illegal refusal to deal, and that there was not any valid purpose to the
WHA rule."
1 1
'
104. See Anderson, 272 U.S. at 361-62, 365.
105. See Boris v. U.S. Football League, No. CV 83-4980 LEW (Kx), 1984 WL 894, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1325 (D. Conn.
1977); Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1064-66. The following portion of this Article is adapted
from my article with C. Keith Harrison in the Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy, see
Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 15-17, and my article with Brian Doyle in the
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, see Edelman & Doyle, supra note 45,
at 426-28.
106. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1055, 1067. The NBA clubs thereafter moved for a
stay of this ruling, which was granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals but was then
overturned by the Supreme Court. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., No. 71-1089,
1971 WL 3015, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1971) (per curiam), rev'd sub norn. Haywood v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1204, 1206-07 (1971) (Douglas, Circuit Justice).
107. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
108. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 16; see also Edelman & Doyle, supra note 45,
426-27.
109. Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1317, 1325.
110. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 16 (citing Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1317); see
also Edelman & Doyle, supra note 45, at 427.
111. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 16 (citing Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1321-22).
"The Linseman court also found that antitrust law did not allow for exceptions to the Sherman
Act based on a sports league's purported economic necessity." Id. (citing Linseman, 439 F. Supp.
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Then, in Boris v. United States Football League, the Central District of
California struck down another unilateral age/education policy. 112  The
plaintiff in that case, Robert Boris, a former University of Arizona football
player, "challenged an age/education policy of the United States Football
League (USFL), which mandated that all prospective players exhaust their
college eligibility before entering the draft.", 3 Ultimately, the parties reached
a settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice.'14
Most recently, in Clarett v. National Football League,115 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, applying the Rule of
Reason, found that the NFL's age/education requirement that prevented
players less than three years removed from high school from entering the
league was prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.1 16  Ultimately,
however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and upheld the
age/education requirement because it found that the requirement was a product
of collective bargaining and was thus insulated from liability by the non-
statutory labor exemption.117
Unlike each of these four age/education requirements, the NFL Personal
Conduct Policy only affects players who have engaged in purported
wrongdoing. 18  However, under antitrust law this distinction is entirely
irrelevant.1 9 Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not discriminate on social
policy grounds. Not only does it prohibit agreements that exclude
scrupulous employees, but it also prohibits agreements that exclude bona fide
wrongdoers. 121
at 1322). The court wrote that the .'[e]xclusion of traders from the market by means of
combination or conspiracy is so inconsistent with the free-market principles embodied in the
Sherman Act that it is not to be saved by reference to the need for preserving the collaborators'
profit margins."' Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322 (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
384 U.S. 127, 146 (1966)).
112. Boris v. U.S. Football League, No. Cv. 83-4980 LEW (Kx), 1984 WL 894, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 28, 1984).
113. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 17 (citing Boris, 1984 WL 894, at *2).
114. Boris, 1984 WL 894, at *1.
115. 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.
2004).
116. See id. at 408 ("The [NFL age-education requirement] is the perfect example of a policy
that is appropriately analyzed under the 'quick look' standard because its anticompetitive effects
are so obvious."); see also id. at 405 ("[T]he parties agree that the rule of reason applies because
the challenged restraint arises in the context of a sports league.").
117. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
118. See NFL PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY, supra note 1, $ 3 (stating that an NFL employee
"[is] held to a higher standard and expected to conduct [himself] in a way that is responsible,
promotes the values upon which the League is based, and is lawful").
119. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
121. See Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 656-58 (2d Cir. 1957) (finding that
the magazine sales industry cannot avoid antitrust liability by arguing it was necessary to boycott
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Many lower courts-both before and after Professional Engineers-have
found group boycotts to be illegal even where the boycotted employees have
engaged in actual wrongdoing. 22  For instance, in the case Quinonez v.
National Ass 'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found that even
though a plaintiff was fired by two previous employers for admitting "prior
involvements with criminal charges,"123 the defendant employers still were not
allowed to agree with one another to keep that plaintiff out of the securities
industry. 124 Similarly, in Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, the Second Circuit
found that a no-switching agreement between employers in the magazine
industry was "an unreasonable restraint of trade" even where the agreement
purportedly existed as a way to prevent deceptive selling practices.
125
According to the court in Union Circulation, even if attempts to remove
wrongdoers from an industry were laudable, "[t]he petitioners can not be left to
police the ... industry by a method as ripe for abuse as that offered by such
agreements."
126
Recognizing that antitrust law does not allow for employers in an industry to
boycott workers, even those who have admitted to actual wrongdoing, it seems
extraordinarily unlikely that any court would allow the NFL club owners to
enact a policy that enables a group boycott of certain NFL players, some of
whom have neither admitted nor been found guilty of any wrongdoing.
27
b. Aggregate Pro-Competitive Benefits
By contrast, the economic benefits of the NFL Personal Conduct Policy are
extremely limited. The two strongest economic arguments in favor of
upholding the NFL Personal Conduct Policy are (1) that the policy is needed to
a class of employees who had engaged in deceptive practices); see also Quinonez v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 540 F.2d 824, 827-29 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that even though a plaintiff
was fired from two previous employers for admitting "prior involvements with criminal charges,"
the defendants were not allowed to agree to keep that plaintiff out of their industry); McCreery
Angus Farms v. Am. Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1010, 1019 (S.D. I11. 1974), affd, 506
F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that the American Angus Association's indefinite suspension
of a plaintiff angus farmer constituted an illegal group boycott, even though the plaintiff might
have violated the association's blood-typing rules).
122. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
123. Quinonez, 540 F.2d at 827.
124. Id. at 828-29.
125. Union Circulation, 241 F.2d at 658.
126. Id
127. See Changes Approved on Player Conduct, supra note 34; see also NFL Adopts New
Conduct Policy, supra note 34 (discussing a plan to begin suspending players under the NFL
Personal Conduct Policy even if not convicted of any wrongdoing); League Suspends Chiefs
Running Back Johnson for a Game, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2008, at B14 (noting NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell suspended Kansas City Chiefs running back Larry Johnson for one
game for spitting his drink in a woman's face, even though he had not been convicted of any
wrongdoing).
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make competition for football labor available in the first place, 128 and (2) that
the policy is needed to prevent individual club owners from incurring bona fide
industry-wide liability.129 Neither of these arguments, however, is particularly
compelling.
i. The "Necessary to Make Any Competition Available" Argument
Courts, applying the "necessary to make any competition available"
argument, have long upheld otherwise anticompetitive agreements that were
necessary to allow any degree of competition to exist in a particular
marketplace. This is based on the belief that it is more competitive for an
industry to operate under limited restraints than to not operate at all.131 As
explained in a 1977 article by Duke Law Professor John C. Weistart, "[i]t
would be a rather startling notion if the antitrust laws meant that a business
operation such as a league could not protect itself against actions of
participants which might seriously injure, if not destroy, the enterprise."'132
The case Molinas v. National Basketball Ass 'n is the best known example of
a court accepting the "necessary to make any competition available" argument
for upholding a group boycott of a professional athlete.' 33 In that case, former
professional basketball player Jack Molinas (mentioned above in Part I.B.)
brought suit against the NBA and its member clubs after the NBA president
128. See infra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. The NFL would also likely seek to
argue that its Personal Conduct Policy is pro-competitive based on social policy grounds;
however, as explained above, as well as in Professional Engineers, social policy arguments
unrelated to actual economic effects are entirely irrelevant to any Rule of Reason analysis. See
supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; see also Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679,
694 (1978). In addition, the NFL might seek to compare its Personal Conduct Policy with a rule
that would ban an individual from maintaining membership in a private organization such as a
country club or a knitting club. However, that analogy misses the mark legally, given that courts
have long held there is an important legal difference between suspension from a private, industry-
wide business association and suspension from a social club. See McCreery Angus Farms v. Am.
Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1010, 1019 (S.D. I11. 1974) (noting this distinction), affd, 506
F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Blalock v. Ladies Prof'1 Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260,
1265-66 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (stating that suspending Blalock for one year constituted an illegal
group boycott because it is "tantamount to total exclusion from the market of professional golf").
130. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (explaining that a blanket license
among competitors "was an obvious necessity if the thousands of individual negotiations, a
virtual impossibility, were to be avoided" (emphasis added)); see also Weistart, supra note 8, at
707; FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 5.1
(1992), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/hmg080617.pdf (explaining a very similar
"Failing Finn" defense to otherwise anticompetitive mergers). For application of this same
principle in European Union antitrust law, see Union Royale Beige des Socitgs de Football Ass "n
ASBL v. Bosman, Case C-415/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, 265, and Edelman & Doyle, supra note
45, at 430-33.
131. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 20.
132. Weistart, supra note 8, at 707.
133. Molinas v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241,243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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indefinitely suspended him from the league for betting on his team's games.
1 34
In his pleadings, Molinas argued that the NBA "ha[d] entered into a conspiracy
with its member teams and others in restraint of trade,"'1 35 and that his
suspension was "the result of a conspiracy in violation of these laws."'
' 36
Nevertheless, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York rejected Molinas's claim, holding that "a disciplinary rule invoked
against gambling seems about as reasonable a rule as could be imagined"
because "the confidence of the public in basketball has been shattered, due to a
series of gambling incidents."
' 13
As further explained by Professor Weistart:
The success of most professional sports activities depends upon the
fans' belief that games and matches represent honest competition
.... It is unlikely that the interest of fans would continue at present
levels if they had reason to believe that the outcome of the
competition was controlled by factors other than the personal efforts
of those participating and the pre-established rules of the game.'
38
From a post-Professional Engineers economic standpoint, the "necessary to
make any competition available" argument still seems to apply well to
Molinas, where a single gambling scandal could drive an entire league into
bankruptcy. 39 However, this argument does not seem to carry much weight
when applied to the NFL Personal Conduct Policy. This is because, unlike the
NBA's anti-gambling policy, the NFL Personal Conduct Policy does not
protect "honest [on-the-field] competition," and the absence of such a policy
would not likely drive the NFL into imminent bankruptcy.
140
ii. The "Necessary to Avoid Industry- Wide Liability" Argument
Additionally, some courts have upheld agreements that contain some
anticompetitive effects if those agreements are deemed necessary to prevent
liability from flowing to other members of that industry. 141 This sort of pro-
134. Id. at 242-43; see also Bob Oates, A Long Line of Bettors, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1989,
at Pt. Ill. 1
135. Molinas, 190 F. Supp. at 242.
136. Id. at 243.
137. Id. at 243-44. Other language in Molinas seems to imply a broader reasoning for the
court's ruling-for example the court's statement that "[e]very league or association must have
some reasonable governing rules." Id. This broader line of reasoning would be inapplicable
today in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Professional Engineers. See supra notes 97-98
and accompanying text.
138. Weistart, supra note 8, at 707.
139. Molinas, 190 F. Supp. at 243-44.
140. See generally Weistart, supra note 8, at 708-09 (differentiating a commissioner's
attempt to suspend a player from a sports league for cheating from other types of group boycotts).
141. See Neeld v. Nat'l Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1979) (arguing that a
restraint against one-eyed hockey players is reasonable based on the risk to other teams and their
players of being sued should that player lose his other eye); Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d
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competitive effect is discussed briefly by the Supreme Court in a peculiar and
often overlooked footnote to Professional Engineers.142
In the context of labor restraints involving professional sports, the only time
that a court has applied this argument was in the Ninth Circuit case Neeld v.
National Hockey League.143 In that case, the court found an NHL bylaw that
precluded any player with just one eye from competing in NHL games was
reasonable because the "primary purpose and direct effect of the [NHL] by-law
was not anticompetitive but rather safety," as well as avoiding lawsuits against
the league and its members.144
Nevertheless, much like the aforementioned "necessary to make any
competition available" argument, the "necessary to avoid industry-wide
liability" argument does not provide much support for upholding the NFL
Personal Conduct Policy. Once again, there is simply no compelling evidence
that all thirty-two NFL clubs would become exposed to substantial liability if a
single club chooses to hire a player with a violent or criminal past.
3. Harm
The final prong of the Rule of Reason requires a plaintiff to show that the
allegedly anticompetitive agreement caused harm. 45 In the context of a labor-
market antitrust claim, most courts have recognized that this prong is met
merely by showing harm to a prospective emplo 'ee. 146 However, some courts
may require direct proof of harm to consumers.147
Here, choosing the appropriate test does not seem to affect this prong's
outcome at all. The joint action by NFL clubs clearly produces harm to
suspended football players by denying them the opportunity to sell their
services.148 However, it also hurts football game consumers by taking away
932, 938-39 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc) (protecting oneself from potential products liability is a
lawful reason to restrict the resale of a product in a manner that might otherwise violate antitrust
laws); see also Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 696 n.22 (1978) (citing Tripoli,
425 F.2d 932).
142. Prof'lEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 696 n.22.
143. Neeld, 594 F.2d at 1300.
144. Id.; see also id. at 1298 n.l (explaining that the NHL bylaw specifically states that "[a]
player with only one eye, or one of whose eyes has a vision of only three-sixtieths (3-60ths) or
under, shall not be eligible to play for [an NHL] Member Club").
145. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 22; see also Edelman & Doyle, supra note 45, at
416.
146. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 22; see also Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740
F.2d 739, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1984).
147. See, e.g., Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.3d 667, 670
(7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.).
148. Weistart, supra note 8, at 706; see Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332,
336 (7th Cir. 1967) (a covenant not to compete for workers violates § I as long as it "impair[s]
full and free competition in the supply of a service or commodity to the public"); Pletcher &
Ghesquiere, supra note 57, at 179 (defining harm to an athlete denied eligibility as loss of salary).
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their opportunity to express a preference for football games featuring the
suspended players.
C. Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
Presuming that a suspended player is able to make a prima facie showing of
an antitrust violation, a court finally turns to whether any exemption or
affirmative defense would negate the finding of antitrust liability. 49 Here, the
only potentially relevant exemption or affirmative defense is the non-statutory
labor exemption.'50
"[T]he interaction of the [antitrust laws] and federal labor legislation is an
area of law marked more by controversy than by clarity." 51 Currently, there is
a split among the circuits about how broadly the non-statutory labor exemption
should be applied. 152 In the 1976 case Mackey v. National Football League,
the Eighth Circuit "held that the non-statutory labor exemption applies only
where an alleged restraint of trade: (1) involves mandatory subjects of
bargaining, (2) primarily affects the parties involved, and (3) is reached
through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining (the Mackey Test).",15' Both the
Sixth Circuit and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
have since applied this test in the context of professional sports disputes.
154
Meanwhile, in the Third Circuit, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied a very similar test in the context of a
professional sports dispute that occurred four years before Mackey.1
55
In 2004, the Second Circuit, however, held in the case Clarett v. National
Football League that the non-statutory labor exemption applies more broadly,
and might extend to any situation where the exemption's application would
"ensure the successful operation of the collective bargaining process" (the
Clarett Test).156 No other court has directly applied the Clarett Test in the
149. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
150. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 22; see also Edelman & Doyle, supra note 45, at
417-19.
151. Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
152. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 15; see also Edelman & Doyle, supra note 45, at
418-19.
153. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 15 (citing Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543
F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)).
154. See McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Zimmerman
v. Nat'l Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1986).
155. See Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 499
(E.D. Pa. 1972) ("[A] multi-employer organization will be insulated from unfair labor practice
prosecutions only if it acts in good faith and takes only the limited steps necessary to protect itself
.... ").
156. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis
omitted).
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context of professional sports; however, many courts have never addressed this
issue. 157
1. Is the NFL 's Personal Conduct Policy a Mandatory Subject of
Bargaining?
In beginning the analysis, "[t]he first prong of both the Mackey and Clarett
tests addresses whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy is a mandatory
subject of bargaining."' 158 The mandatory subjects of bargaining include hours,
wages, and working conditions.
1 59
Courts have traditionally held that "[a] grievance-arbitration procedure is a
term or condition of employment and a mandatory subject of bargaining within
the meaning of [the National Labor Relations Act].,, 160 However, even if the
NFL Personal Conduct Policy were not found to be sufficiently related to
grievance arbitration for a court to conclude that it is a "mandatory subject of
bargaining," both the courts in Mackey and Clarett have separately held that
.... 161
any conduct affecting wages, even indirectly, is a mandatory subject. NFL
player suspensions affect wages of suspended players, because whenever a
player is suspended, that player is docked pay.' In addition, player
expulsions more broadly affect wages because they implicate the amount of
salary cap room that is available to all non-expelled players.
157. The Sixth Circuit cited to Clarett in National Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth
Whalers, 419 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2005), for the general proposition that "[a]ny anti-competitive
effect of a properly bargained collective bargaining agreement is excluded from antitrust scrutiny
by a non-statutory antitrust exemption." Id. at 474. However, that reference is entirely divorced
from the circuit split between Mackey and Clarett.
158. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 22.
159. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000); Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S.
342, 349 (1958); DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW § 7.4[B], at 210
(1999).
160. NLRB v. Indep. Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Chi. Magnesium
Castings Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 1028, 1034 (7th Cir. 1980) ("It is moreover well settled that
grievance machinery is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining."); Pollack, supra note 24, at
1648.
161. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140 (asserting that conduct that has "tangible effects on the
wages and working conditions of current NFL players" is a mandatory subject of bargaining); see
also Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that conduct
that "operates to restrict a player's ability to move from one team to another and depresses player
salaries" constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining).
162. See League Suspends Chiefs Running Back Johnson for a Game, supra note 127 (noting
that Commissioner Roger Goodell's one-game suspension of Kansas City Chiefs' running back
Larry Johnson cost Johnson his weekly paycheck of $147,000).
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2. Does the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Primarily Affect the Parties
Involved?
The second prong of the Mackey Test addresses whether the NFL Personal
Conduct Policy primarily affects the parties involved in the collective• • 163
bargaining process. However, "[i]t is unclear whether this prong also
applies under the Clarett Test."
'1 64
Applying the Mackey Test, there is no doubt that the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy primarily affects the parties involved in collective bargaining. This is
because the parties most affected by the NFL Personal Conduct Policy-the
NFL clubs and the suspended players-are both represented by collective
bargaining. 165 Under the Clarett Test, to the extent that a plaintiff even needs
to meet this prong, the same logic would apply.'
66
3. Is the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Reached Through Bona Fide Arm 's-
Length Bargaining?
Completing the analysis, "[t]he final prong of the Mackey Test addresses
whether the alleged agreement was reached through bona fide arm's-length
bargaining. ' 167 According to Mackey, this prong of the Rule of Reason is met
if a particular term appears in the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
168
By contrast, this requirement is not met where one party unilaterally imposes a
•- 169
provision.
The NFL Personal Conduct Policy does not appear anywhere in the
collective bargaining agreement. 170 Although some evidence indicates that the
NFLPA was aware of the NFL clubs' desire to implement a league-wide
personal conduct policy (and may have even voiced some support for the
163. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
164. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 23.
165. See id at 69; cf Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614-15. This is distinctly different from a league-
entry policy such as an age-education requirement, where the parties primarily affected are those
that are unable to vote on league matters and are therefore, in the view of some, "economic actors
completely removed from the bargaining relationship." Zimmerman v. Nat'l Football League,
632 F. Supp. 398, 405 (D.D.C. 1986).
166. See Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 23; see also Edelman & Doyle, supra note
45, at 418-19.
167. Edelman & Harrison, supra note 45, at 23.
168. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16 (finding no bona fide arm's-length bargaining); see
also Phoenix Elec. Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 867 F. Supp. 925, 938 (D. Or. 1994)
(examining whether the agreement was negotiated), aff'd, 81 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 1996).
169. See In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 955 F.2d 457, 473-74 (6th Cir. 1992) (Ryan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 406 ("This
analysis denies the labor exemption to anti-competitive agreements imposed unilaterally by one
party, usually management, without regard to the interests of the other."). Cf Chi. Magnesium
Castings Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 1028, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1980) (explaining that unilateral
changes to a collective bargaining agreement during the period of agreement is an unfair labor
practice); NLRB v. Indep. Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443, 446-47 (8th Cir. 1979) (same).
170. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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policy), 171 the NFLPA never agreed to insert the policy as a rider into the
collective bargaining agreement, which clearly would have indicated the intent
of both parties to make the policy binding.
This last point is critical from both an evidentiary and a practical
perspective. From an evidentiary perspective, the Parol Evidence clause in the
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement states that any proposed changes,
alterations, or amendments to the collective bargaining agreement may only
take place through "written agreement."'' 7 2  Therefore, any evidence of
purported verbal changes to the Collective Bargaining Agreement is simply
irrelevant.
Additionally, from a more practical perspective, if the NFLPA were found to
have agreed to the NFL Personal Conduct Policy, any potential liability for the
policy would shift from the NFL teams (under antitrust law) to the NFLPA
under the union's duty of fair representation. 173 Given that the duty of fair
representation requires a union to act in a non-discriminatory manner,174 by
agreeing to the NFL Personal Conduct Policy, the NFLPA would incur the risk
of being sued by an NFL player with a criminal record-a protected class, at
least in the state of New York. 175 Therefore, it would be tremendously unfair,
as a matter of law, to bind the NFLPA to the terms of the NFL Personal
Conduct Policy based merely on a few passing statements.
IV. FOUR LEGAL WAYS FOR NFL CLUBS TO KEEP VIOLENT OFFENDERS OUT
OF THE NFL
Based on the analysis above, it is clear that the NFL Personal Conduct
Policy has the potential to violate antitrust law.176 While it is not clear that
every federal court would find the NFL Personal Conduct Policy illegal (in
fact, a court in the Second Circuit most probably would not), 77 there are many
171. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
172. NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012, supra note 2, art. LV, § 19, at
235 (Parol Evidence).
173. See Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 962 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Even if some
such arrangements might be illegal because of discrimination against new employees (players),
the proper action would be one for breach of the duty of fair representation.").
174. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) ("A breach of the statutory duty of fair
representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining
unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253 (9th
Cir. 1985) (explaining the duty of fair representation).
175. See N.Y. CORRECTIONS LAW § 752 (McKinney Supp. 2009) (stating that "no
employment or license held by an individual . . . shall be denied or acted upon adversely by
reason of the individual's having been previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses, or
by reason of a finding of lack of good 'moral character"' unless one of two exceptions apply).
176. See discussion supra Part Ill.
177. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 142-43 & n.19 (2d Cir. 2004)
(finding that to determine whether the non-statutory labor exemption applied to the NFL age-
education rules, the court "need not determine whether as a matter of law the Constitution and
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other ways that the NFL clubs could encourage player decorum without risking
antitrust liability.
178
A. Independent Team Enforcement of Moral Clauses
One alternative way for NFL clubs to encourage player decorum would be
for NFL clubs to exercise the morals clauses that are included in all NFL
player contracts more vigorously. Specifically, Paragraph 11 of the NFL
Player Contract allows individual club owners to terminate any player's
contract if that player is "engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by
[the club] to adversely affect or reflect on [the club].' ' 179 This language is far
broader in scope than Paragraph 15 of the NFL Player Contract, which only
allows a commissioner to suspend a player for conduct that is deemed
"detrimental to the League or professional football." 180
In determining whether to terminate a player's contract for breach of his
morals clause, a club owner must balance his perceptions of that player's
positive contributions to his team with that player's negative conduct.
Ultimately, a club owner's decision about whether to retain a particular player
would often turn on how a club owner believes that his fan base would react to
that player's continued presence. However, if a particular club owner feels
strongly about the gravity of a particular player's wrongdoing, he may choose
to release that player even where the player continues to provide a strong
return on investment.
From an antitrust perspective, it is perfectly valid for an individual club
owner to release a player pursuant to the morals clause in his contract, so long
as he is doing so independently (rather than in concert with other club
owners). 8 1 Furthermore, if a club owner chooses to release a player for breach
of his morals clause, the thirty-one other NFL club owners would then gain the
opportunity to sign that player, thus allowing consumer preferences to play a
dominant role in dictating whether that player ultimately finds new
employment.
B. Petitioning Congress to Regulate Eligibility Standards for Professional
Athletes
A second way that NFL clubs may attempt to regulate player conduct would
be for the clubs to petition Congress to pass a statute that restricts one's right to
work as a professional football player if one has engaged in past misconduct.
Bylaws that contained the eligibility rules were incorporated by reference into the current
collective bargaining agreement").
178. See discussion infra Part IV.A-D.
179. NFL PLAYER CONTRACT, supra note 38, para. 1., at 252.
180. See id. para. 15, at 253 (noting the difference in meaning between "detrimental" and
simply "adverse").
181. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (noting that independent conduct does not meet one of
the threshold issues for a violation under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
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If a petition of this nature were successful, Congress might ultimately pass a
statute similar to the NFL Personal Conduct Policy, thus keeping perceived
wrongdoers statutorily out of the NFL. However, Congress also might tweak
aspects of the current policy to make it more consistent with other societal
goals. For example, Congress might remove any language from the NFL
Personal Conduct Policy pertaining to lifetime banishment, because
rehabilitative aspects of our criminal justice system seem to point away from
that particular remedy.1
82
From an antitrust perspective, petitioning Congress to regulate player
conduct does not present any concern under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Even if
the NFL clubs concertedly petition Congress, their conduct remains entirely
exempt based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which allows competing
businesses to join in combination for the purpose of influencing government
action. 183 This is true even if the underlying goal is to restrain competition.'
84
In addition, § 1 of the Sherman Act does not prevent Congress from
regulating one's eligibility to participate in a given industry. 185 Rather, the
Sherman Act only prevents private citizens, outside of the scope of a collective
bargaining agreement, from collectively implementing their own form of self-
governance. 16
C. Petitioning Congress for Limited Antitrust Exemption to Regulate Player
Eligibility
A third legal way for club owners to keep undesirable players out of the
NFL would be to petition Congress for a limited antitrust exemption to self-
regulate player eligibility. Again, this kind of collective petitioning is fully187
protected from antitrust scrutiny under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. In
182. See Joel Michael Ugolini, Even a Violent Game Has Its Limits: A Look at the NFL's
Responsibility for the Behavior ofIts Players, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 41, 45 & n.28 (2007); Monica
Scales, Note, Employer Catch-22: The Paradox Between Employer Liability for Employee
Criminal Acts and the Prohibition Against Ex-Convict Discrimination, I I GEO. MASON L. REV.
419, 421 (2002) ("[T]he federal government and some state governments have passed legislation
that prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals with conviction records unless
the crime is substantially related to the occupation."); see also James R. Todd, Comment, "It's
Not My Problem": How Workplace Violence and Potential Employer Liability Lead to
Employment Discrimination of Ex-Convicts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 725, 736 (2004) (discussing
employment discrimination statutes in New York and Wisconsin).
183. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, § 3.04[A], at 71; see also United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) ("Joint efforts to influence public officials do not
violate antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition."); E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-38 (1961).
184. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, § 3.04[A], at 71.
185. See "Political" Blacklisting in the Motion Picture Industry, supra note 98, at 579-80.
186. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1971);
"Political" Blacklisting in the Motion Picture Industry, supra note 98, at 579-80.
187. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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addition, there is some precedent for Congress granting limited antitrust
exemptions to the NFL where it deems appropriate.
From both a right-to-work perspective and a consumer-welfare perspective,
even if Congress were to grant a limited antitrust exemption to the NFL clubs
for the purposes of enforcing their Personal Conduct Policy, such an outcome
would be preferable to allowing the NFL clubs to engage in unbridled self-
regulation. This is because, if Congress grants the NFL a statutory right to
self-regulate, Congress can impose safeguards to ensure the NFL does so
justly.",
D. Collectively Bargain the Terms of the NFL Personal Conduct Policy with
the NFLPA
Finally, and perhaps most easily, the NFL clubs could enforce a personal
conduct policy by simply agreeing with the NFLPA to add it in writing to the
collective bargaining agreement, thus insulating the policy from antitrust
liability under the non-statutory labor exemption. 19° As a matter of labor law,
courts have found that negotiating over personal conduct policies is an
appropriate part of the collective bargaining process. 19 1  For example, the
Second Circuit noted that "[f]ederal labor policy ... allows [unions] to seek
the best deal for the greatest number [of employees] by the exercise of
collective rather than individual bargaining power. Yet for the NFL clubs
188. See, e.g., Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)) (granting the NFL teams a special antitrust exemption to
pool and jointly sell their television broadcast rights); see also Football Merger Act of 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-800, § 6, 80 Stat. 1508, 1515-16 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1291) (adding language to the
Sports Broadcasting Act that "[antitrust] laws [further] shall not apply to a joint agreement by
which the member clubs of two or more professional football leagues . .. combine their
operations in expanded single league ... if such agreement increases rather than decreases the
number of professional football clubs so operating, and the provisions of which are directly
relevant thereto").
189. It is not unusual for Congress to use the threat of removing a sports league's special
antitrust exemption to compel related conduct. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, Sports and the City:
How to Curb Professional Sports Teams' Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERS J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 35, 71-72 (2008) (explaining that Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter's proposed
Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999, § 952, 106th Cong., intended to repeal
the antitrust exemption granted to NFL teams by the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 if NFL
teams did not devote some broadcasting revenue toward the cost of building their own stadiums).
190. See discussion supra Part III.C; see also Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954,
959 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Among the fundamental principles of federal labor policy is the legal rule
that employees may eliminate competition among themselves through a governmentally
supervised majority vote selecting an exclusive bargaining representative.").
191. Wood, 809 F.2d at 959 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)) (noting that, indeed, "section 9(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act provides that '[riepresentatives ... selected ... by the majority
of the employees in a unit ... shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining."' (alteration and omissions in original) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 159(a))).
192. Id.
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to enjoy this liability shield, the clubs must engage in bona fide arm's-length
bargaining rather than merely engaging in an ad hoc process. If real
bargaining were to occur, however, the challenge for NFL clubs would involve
convincing the NFLPA to accept a potential shift in liability to them for any
player grievances arising out of the NFL Personal Conduct Policy. 193  To
convince the NFLPA to incur this liability, the NFL clubs would likely have to
offer something of substance in exchange to the NFLPA.
V. CONCLUSION
Since April 10, 2007, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has suspended
several players under the NFL Personal Conduct Policy. Most notably,
Commissioner Goodell disciplined comerback Adam "Pacman" Jones for his
five separate arrests by suspending him for the entire 2007 football season,194
wide receiver Chris Henry for his four separate arrests by suspending him for
the first half of the 2007 NFL season, 195 and quarterback Michael Vick for his
role in organizing an illegal dog fighting ring by suspending him
indefinitely.'
96
The NFL's goal of promoting positive football role models is undeniably
important. Many American children idolize professional football players.
In addition, sports figures serve an "especially [important] role within low-
income and African-American communities.'
' 98
Nevertheless, the method by which NFL club owners have sought to banish
players from their league is improper. The NFL Personal Conduct Policy
harms the players who Commissioner Goodell suspends by concertedly taking
away their right to practice their profession-a right that, according to the
Honorable Learned Hand, is deeply entrenched in modem antitrust law. 199 In
addition, the policy harms football consumers by stripping them of their ability
to signal a preference for watching NFL games that feature particular
players.
200
193. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
194. See Battista, N.F.L. Assesses Lengthy Bans, supra note 1; Judy Battista, Two Players
Meet with Commissioner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at D6 [hereinafter Battista, Two Players
Meet with Commissioner].
195. See Battista, NFL. Assesses Lengthy Bans, supra note 1; Battista, Two Players Meet
with Commissioner, supra note 194.
196. See John Branch, Another Win, But No Suspense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007, at Dl.
197. See Marc Edelman, Note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men's College
Basketball, 35 MICHIGAN J. L. REFORM 861, 878 (2002).
198. See id. (citing George 0. Assibey-Mensah, Role Models and Youth Development:
Evidence and Lessons from the Perception of African-American Youth, 21 W.J. OF BLACK STUD.
242, 244 (1997)) (discussing a 1997 study of African American children that found 85% of ten-
year olds and 98% of eighteen-year olds considered their primary role model to be an athlete).
199. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J., concurring); see also
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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As discussed above, there are four legitimate ways in which the NFL clubs
could approach the goal of improving football player conduct, and avoid
antitrust liability. First, individual NFL club owners may vigorously enforce
the morals clauses included in the standard NFL player contract. Second, the
clubs may collectively petition Congress to regulate eligibility standards for
professional football players. Third, the clubs may petition Congress to grant
the NFL clubs a limited antitrust exemption to self-regulate player eligibility
legally. Finally, the clubs could reach a collectively bargained agreement with
the NFLPA over the terms of eligibility to play in the NFL.
What the NFL clubs may not do, however, is use the egregious personal
wrongdoings committed by a few NFL players as a carte blanche license to
engage in a group boycott. Indeed, two wrongs simply do not make a right. If
the NFL club owners truly want to encourage NFL players to act with greater
decorum, they too must tread carefully to follow the strictest letter of the law.
